

*Bazat-Tahera Qutbuddin*

## HEALING THE SOUL: PERSPECTIVES OF MEDIEVAL MUSLIM WRITERS

The founders of the Divine Laws are physicians of the soul ... and the purpose of them all is recovering the [lost] health of souls and protecting them from harm ... Just as physicians of the body prescribe different treatments in different countries because of different diseases in different times, ... similarly, the actions of physicians [of the soul] with regard to the Divine Laws, ... their command and permission for one thing and their prohibition and forbidding of another, are identical to the actions of physicians of the body and their treatments.

*Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*

For Muslims, the human soul occupies a central position in both philosophy and religion. Discourse on prophecy and providence centers around the role of human beings within the cosmos, and the moral refining of the human soul is a primary concern. The process of this refining is often explained using a medical analogy where vices such as envy and greed are “diseases” of the soul and right action is the “cure.” This paper examines the development of the concept of “healing the soul” in medieval Muslim texts (ninth through twelfth centuries) using the works of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn al-Jawzī. These five writers have been selected because they have different perspectives on healing the soul and their works represent a broad spectrum of the methodologies used.

Three terms were used by the medieval Muslims to refer to that spiritual entity, which, together with the corporeal body, makes up the human being: *nafs*, *rūh*, and *qalb* (literally

“heart”). Much has been written about the various usages of these terms within the Qur’ān and other Islamic works.<sup>2</sup> However, since the purpose of this paper is to examine the ideas of the medieval Muslims concerning the spiritual medicine analogy rather than their terminology, that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. No differentiation will therefore be made here between the Arabic terms, and the English word “soul” will be used in its general meaning.

The medieval Muslims drew upon both the Greek and the Qur’ānic heritages in their discourse on healing the soul. In Greek ethical philosophy, reason was supreme and moderation was the ideal. The Greek philosophers considered vices to be diseases of the soul. The Qur’ān defined doubt in the unity of God and in the veracity of the Prophet’s message as “disease of the heart” (*marad al-qalb*). The emphasis was on belief, and salvation was the goal of “curing” the soul. Some medieval authors focused on the Greek idea of vices as diseases of the soul and excluded the Qur’ānic belief-based concept, some used only the Qur’ānic notion, and others were influenced by both approaches.

#### THE GREEK INFLUENCE

Ancient Greek writers widely used the concept of medicine for the soul. Among those whose works contained references to the concept were Plato (c.428-347 B.C.E.), who called vices “diseases” of the soul in the *Republic*,<sup>3</sup> Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.), who drew a parallel between physical health and the good moral qualities of the soul in his *Nicomachean Ethics*,<sup>4</sup> and the philosopher-physician Galen (129-199 C.E.), who wrote two treatises exclusively devoted to the vices of the soul: *The diagnosis and cure of the soul’s passions* and *The diagnosis and cure of the soul’s errors*.<sup>5</sup> The gnomologia, or wise sayings of the ancient Greeks, also contain references to the concept of healing the soul.<sup>6</sup>

According to Greek writers, the highest state of well-being for a soul was the perfection of reason, and the ultimate goal of reason was to arrive at the truth. Vice, they stated, was sickness,

while virtue was health. Galen saw the vices of anger, envy, greed, and conceit, as the most vicious diseases, followed by grief, lust and fear. Lesser ones were obstinacy, love of glory, lust for power, drunkenness, excessive animosity, covetousness, love of reputation, meanness and ambition. His method of diagnosis was to find a friend, an overseer to observe one’s vices and point them out, and to take note of one’s enemies’ opinions. Aristotle believed that the cure for sick souls was habituation; we learn to act rightly, he said, by, in fact, acting rightly: we become courageous by acting courageously, and we learn to control ourselves by controlling ourselves.

These Greek works were translated into Syriac and Arabic in the ninth and tenth centuries by the school of Hunayn b. Ishāq,<sup>7</sup> and Greek ideas greatly influenced the medieval Muslim authors in their ideas on healing the soul. Galen’s treatise on the “passions” was the direct source of al-Rāzi’s *al-Tibb al-rūḥānī*, and a major influence on the works of later Muslim thinkers such as Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī and Ibn al-Jawzi.

#### THE INFLUENCE OF THE QUR’ĀN AND THE HADITH

And some men there are who say, “We believe in God and the Last Day”; but they are not believers, and only themselves they deceive, and they are not aware. In their hearts is a sickness, and God has increased their sickness, and there awaits them a painful chastisement for that they have cried lies.

Qur’ān 2:10<sup>8</sup>

The medical analogy is used by the Qur’ān in twelve different verses that contain the phrase “In their hearts is a sickness” or “In his heart is a sickness.”<sup>9</sup> This “sickness” is interpreted by most exegetes as doubt (*shakk*) [in Islam], confusion (*ḥayra*), hypocrisy (*nifāq*), or outright denial (*jaḥd*) and disbelief (*takdhīb*), the reference being to the Hypocrites (*al-munāfiqūn*).<sup>10</sup> The Qur’ānic idea that right belief is the health of the soul influenced Muslim writers in their expositions of the subject, especially the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’.

As for the Hadith, its very few references to disease of the soul touch briefly upon both the belief-based and the ethical aspect. One Hadith that combines both aspects calls envy and enmity diseases that preclude belief:

The disease of the communities before you has crept into [your souls]: envy and enmity, and enmity is the shaver, the shaver of religion, not of hair. By Him in whose hands is the soul of Muḥammad, you will not believe until you love each other. Shall I not inform you of something that will cause you to love each other if you do it? Greet each other with the greeting of peace.<sup>11</sup>

Another Hadith in an ethical spirit condemns miserliness as a disease.<sup>12</sup> A third, in the belief-based sense calls the Qur'ān the cure.<sup>13</sup> These Hadith were quoted by Miskawayh and Ibn al-Jawzī, and were used as justification for their ethical thought.

#### THE PERSPECTIVES OF FIVE MEDIEVAL MUSLIM WRITERS

The next section analyzes in detail the concept of healing the soul in the works of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn al-Jawzī. These works are examined within a chronological framework in order to trace the influence of the earlier writers on the later ones.

#### AL-RĀZĪ (250-313 A.H. / 864-925 C.E.)

Abū Bakr al-Rāzī was a celebrated physician and philosopher, who lived in Rayy and Baghdad. His ethical treatise *al-Tibb al-rūḥānī*<sup>14</sup> (Spiritual Medicine) proposes curing base character traits like anger and envy by reflection and instruction. The physician of the soul is the philosopher, and moderation in all things is the ideal. Al-Rāzī says the goal of spiritual medicine is to refine the soul in order to enable it to exist independently of matter upon leaving the body. Thus, the book is philosophical-ethical in content. There is no acknowledgment of Islamic influence. It quotes widely from writings and sayings ascribed to Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Eudemus and Galen, but not from

any religious source. Muḥammad is not named, not even in the formulaic introductory praise paragraph. In fact, al-Rāzī speaks of the prophets with open contempt, calling the carnal love (*'ishq*) of prophets "one of their slips and peccadilloes,"<sup>15</sup> while the philosophers are always spoken of with reverence. This is not surprising in the light of al-Rāzī's polemics against Islam and organized religion.

The foundation of al-Rāzī's thesis is laid in the first two chapters of the book, where he discusses the excellence of reason (*'aql*) and the suppression of desire (*hawā*). Reason, he says, stems from the rational soul, while desire arises from the animal or appetitive soul. The exercising of reason gives rise to virtues, and the following of one's desire leads to vices. However, he says, there is one vice, miserliness, that is not wholly due to desire; it can as easily arise out of an excessive fear of poverty, as from pleasure in keeping things to oneself purely for the sake of keeping them.<sup>16</sup>

Al-Rāzī calls the vices "base accidents" (*a'rāḍ radi'a*), most of which he considers to be inherently base, while a few are base only in excess. For example, he says anger is put into an animal to be a means of taking revenge upon another that causes it pain. When this disposition in humans is taken to excess to the extent that reason is lost in consequence, its injury to the one moved by the emotion is greater than the injury it causes to the object of the emotion.<sup>17</sup>

The vices al-Rāzī enumerates are desire, conceit, envy, anger, mendacity, miserliness, excessive reflection and worry, grief, greed, drunkenness, excessive sexual intercourse, excessive fondness and trifling [with one's beard, etc.], earning, acquiring and spending, quest for worldly rank and station, and fear of death. Galen spoke of lust and drunkenness as vices to be overcome, but I have not come across them in the works of any of the other Islamic authors on the subject, except for al-Ghazālī, who advocates initial celibacy for the novice; trifling is also unique to al-Rāzī's list of vices. The discussion on each vice contains a definition of that vice, its causes, the diagnosis, and the cure. Conceit, for example, is described as arising out of every man's love for himself, his admiration of every fine

quality he possesses above its merits, and disapprobation of every bad quality below its deserts. The method prescribed for repelling conceit is entrusting the estimation of one's good and bad qualities to another.<sup>18</sup>

Al-Rāzi advocates a two-part method for discovering one's vices which summarizes Galen's views on the subject: 1) keep asking an intelligent man who is your frequent associate to point out your vices, and 2) find out what neighbors and colleagues are saying about you. Both these ideas are reiterated later in al-Ghazālī's and Ibn al-Jawzī's works. Al-Rāzi notes that it is important to keep expressing gratitude to the friend.

THE IKHWĀN AL-ŞAFĀ' (3RD, 4TH, OR 5TH CENTURY A.H./ 9TH, 10TH OR 11TH CENTURY C.E.)

The Ikhwān al-Şafā' (Pure Brethren) were philosophers believed to be Ismā'īlis by some scholars and Carmathians by others.<sup>19</sup> Their *Rasā'il* (treatises) are an encyclopaedia of all knowledge of their time, a blend of neo-Platonic and Islamic ideas. In them, the Ikhwān al-Şafā' state that doubt about the Hereafter is the disease of the soul, and this doubt arises out of ignorance.<sup>20</sup> They emphasize the attainment of the next world, and salvation is given primary importance. The strongly ethical slant given to this subject by other Muslim writers is missing here and the cure of vices is considered just one of the many parts of the complete cure.<sup>21</sup> The *Rasā'il* also stress the divine nature of the cure; the prophets, including Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muḥammad, as well as the progeny of Muḥammad, are named physicians of the soul (*aṭibba' al-nufūs*).<sup>22</sup> The Ikhwān's exposition of medicine for the soul deals with the larger, conceptual aspects of the subject, and the medical analogy is used by them to explain the mission of the prophets. This approach is different from the approaches of the other Muslim thinkers discussed in this paper, who dwell more on the specifics of the diseases and the cures. The repeated occurrence of the healing analogy in the final, most important section of the *Rasā'il*—the Divine Sciences—is indicative of the importance of the analogy to the Ikhwān's philosophy of salvation.

The Ikhwān assert that the purpose of the physicians of the soul, who are the divine law-givers, is to cure souls and keep them healthy. Since people's natures, their character traits, and their aspirations differ, souls contract different diseases according to differences in time, place, nature, and habit. Therefore, the laws of the prophets, their commands and prohibitions, also change, taking into account what is most beneficial for each successive group of people.<sup>23</sup> Jesus is cited as an example because he cured the blind and the leper and raised the dead. Blindness, leprosy, and death, say the Ikhwān, are analogous to ignorance. Jesus therefore actually cured the far more dangerous disease of ignorance by utilizing the medicine of divine secrets and wisdom, by giving the sick doses of *tawḥīd* (proclaiming the unity of God) and *tamjīd* (glorification of God), by teaching them to ask forgiveness and to give up illicit desires.<sup>24</sup> This justification offered for the abrogation of the successive Shari'as of the prophets is not used by any of the other authors discussed in this paper. Among the prophets' duties are listed the laying down of complete laws, treating sick souls of imperfect orientations and absurd opinions, base habits, and bad actions, teaching them good habits, and perpetuating a religious tradition (*sunna*), in terms of legally permitted acts (*halāl*) and legally prohibited ones (*harām*).<sup>25</sup>

The physician of the soul, say the Ikhwān, has to know the different categories of diseased souls, in order to be able to treat them effectively. Three categories are described: 1) Those who deny the inner, esoteric meaning of both the physical aspects of the Hereafter and the laws of the Shari'a. The physician, they say, has to be extremely gentle with these, for their souls are "drowning in the sleep of ignorance."<sup>26</sup> He has to encourage them to undertake the laws of the Shari'a, gradually initiating them into understanding the depths of its inner meaning. 2) Those who want to know the inner meaning and accept it when told to them without proof or argument. These have healthy souls, say the Ikhwān, and have to be taught. After a while, they will come to understand the proofs as well. 3) Those who collect knowledge eclectically. These, they say, cannot be taught, for

the true answer has to be based on a single ideology or basis (*aṣl*).<sup>27</sup>

The prophets' and their successors' mission of saving souls is presented through allegory, a favorite device of the Ikhwān. They tell the tale of a physician who cautiously goes about healing a whole city of diseased people, until he has cured them all, one by one. Mutual cooperation, which is the essence of the philosophy of Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', plays an important role in the treatment. The allegory is loosely paraphrased in the following passage:

There was a wise man, knowledgeable in medicine, who came to a certain town. He saw that most of the people in that town had a hidden disease that they themselves were unaware of. He wanted to cure them, but realized that if he told them they were sick they would not listen to him, and might even become his enemies. He was full of pity for them, and he sincerely wanted to cure them, so he made a plan. He chose one of the noblemen of the town and gave him a medicinal drink that he had prepared. The man immediately began to feel better, lighter in form and at ease in all his five senses, healthier in body and stronger in soul. He thanked the wise man profusely and asked him if there was anything he could do for him in return. The wise man asked him to help cure another "brother." The two looked for a man not too ill and gave him a dose of the same medicine. He, too, was cured. He thanked the two and asked if he could do something for them in return. They asked him to help cure another brother. Then they dispersed in the town curing the people one by one in secret, until they had cured a great number. Now, when they had a great many people on their side, they made their mission public, and started curing the people by force, until they had cured all the people of that town.<sup>28</sup>

The prophets, say the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', go about curing souls in the same way as the physician of the parable, purifying them and guiding them to salvation. Muḥammad approached first his wife Khadija, then his cousin 'Ali, then Abū Bakr, then Mālik, then Abū Dharr ... until they were forty strong; then they made their mission public. Moses also acted similarly, first secretly

approaching Aaron, then other men of learning from the Children of Israel, until they were seventy, and only then challenging the mission of Pharaoh. Jesus also did the same thing at the beginning of his mission in Jerusalem.<sup>29</sup>

According to the Ikhwān, diseased souls are unaware of their disease just as the diseased people of the town were unaware of theirs, and they neither seek nor want a cure. Awareness of their former diseased state comes only after they are cured, for if disbelief is the disease of the soul, then one has first to believe in order to understand that disbelief is wrong. In contrast, al-Rāzī, Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn al-Jawzī, consider self-awareness of disease to be a prerequisite to the cure. According to them, specific vices like conceit constitute the disease, and a person would need to realize that he is conceited in order to habituate himself to humility.

MISKAWAYH (C.320-421 A.H./ C.932-1030 C.E.)

Miskawayh was a philosopher and historian born in Rayy, who served as secretary to various Buyid viziers and to the Buyid Sultān 'Aḍud al-Dawla. His ethical treatise *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq* (The Refinement of Character)<sup>30</sup> accords equal importance to preserving the good health of the soul and to curing its disease, unlike the other ethical works discussed in this paper which focus solely on the cure. Miskawayh divides the treatment of the soul into two broad categories based on a division of souls into two categories. One category of souls, he says, is those that are healthy, and the role of spiritual medicine vis-à-vis these is to try to preserve their health; the second category is those that are diseased and therefore have to be cured.

The preservation of the first category of souls is sought through association with like, virtuous souls, and avoidance of people and places that could lead them to vice; constant training (*riyāda*) is essential. These healthy souls, he adds, must realize that their health is a gift [from God], and those that possess this gift within their souls do not need to seek it from any outside source.<sup>31</sup> The treatment of the second category is discussed under the rubric of specific cures for each individual vice,

divided according to the three major causes of vice: anger, fear and grief. These three were listed by al-Rāzī as vices, but are seen by Miskawayh as the cause of vices. He divides the vices into those that have their origin in the soul, and those that have their origins in the physical temperament (*mizāj*) and senses (*hawāss*); cures for each vice, he says, should be based upon the category to which it belongs. In this, the *Tahdhib*'s approach is unique, a mixture of the psychotherapeutical and the moral.

The *Tahdhib* follows the Platonic tri-partite division of the soul into rational, animal and appetitive; it ascribes the virtues to the rational, and the vices to the animal and appetitive souls. The health of the soul is considered to lie in the possession of virtues, and vices are its disease. Virtue is presented as the mean between the two faulty extremes of excess and deficiency, which are vices. Thus, there are two main vices per virtue, and many sub-virtues and sub-vices. The virtues discussed are the four cardinal Platonic virtues, with eight corresponding vices: valor is the mean between rashness and cowardice, temperance the mean between avidity and the total absence of desire, wisdom the mean between cunning and ignorance, and justice the mean between tyranny and abjectness. Like al-Rāzī, Miskawayh believes there are certain character traits which are considered base only in excess, and he gives the example of jesting.<sup>32</sup> The vices enumerated by Miskawayh that are additions to al-Rāzī's list of bad character traits are tyranny and the sub-vices of deception, mockery and quarrelling. Regarding the method of diagnosis of the vice-diseases, Miskawayh disagrees with Galen's proposal about relying on a friend to point out one's vices, calling such a notion impractical, and prefers Galen's idea of benefitting from the criticism of one's enemies.

Miskawayh in his *Tahdhib al-akhlāq* propounds the concept of healing the soul in the ethics-based way of the Greeks and al-Rāzī, bringing in scriptural proof-texts to endorse his ideas. 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Izzat, in his book on Miskawayh's ethical philosophy, calls the *Tahdhib*'s philosophy "un-Islamic,"<sup>33</sup> and he traces the origin of Miskawayh's ideas about each individual vice and virtue back to specific Greek sources. Richard Walzer,

too, in his article on the *Tahdhib*, believes that Miskawayh may have shocked less rationalist adherents of the faith by his interpretation of religious data by means of philosophical arguments.<sup>34</sup> Also, even though the identity of the physician is not specified in the *Tahdhib*, it seems as though Miskawayh just stops short of giving the philosopher that designation.

AL-GHAZĀLĪ (450-505 / 1058-1111)

Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī was an outstanding theologian, jurist, mystic and religious reformer, who tried to prove that Sufism was reconcilable with orthodox Islamic thought. Today he is considered one of the greatest authorities of Sunnī Islam. Al-Ghazālī's theory of healing the soul developed over time,<sup>35</sup> with a shift from the philosophical to the religious: his *Mizān al-'amal* (Scale of [Right] Action)<sup>36</sup> and *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* (Revivification of the Religious Sciences)<sup>37</sup> show Greek influence in their emphasis on the ethical aspect of the concept, where vices are seen as the diseases of the soul; his *Ayyuhā al-walad* (O Disciple)<sup>38</sup> displays a Sufi orientation in its discourse on knowledge of God versus ignorance of the Divine;<sup>39</sup> and in his later works, the *Jawāb al-masā'il al-arba' allatī sa'alahā al-Bāṭiniyya bi-Hamadān* (Response to the Four Questions Asked by the Bāṭiniyya in Hamadān)<sup>40</sup> and *al-Munqidh min al-dalāl* (Deliverer from Error),<sup>41</sup> the primary focus is on the formal worship rites of the Sharī'a as the cure for the soul. Perhaps this last shift in focus can be attributed to the rising threat of the so-called Bāṭiniyya<sup>42</sup> or Ibāhiyya,<sup>43</sup> whose emphasis on the inner meaning (*bāṭin*) of the Sharī'a rites was gaining strength in learned circles, and against whom al-Ghazālī felt compelled to write a number of strong refutations.<sup>44</sup>

The moderation of character traits, according to al-Ghazālī in the *Mizān* and the *Ihyā'*, is equivalent to the good health of the soul; sickness of the soul is found in extremes, just as the imbalance of the humors causes physical disease. Vices, he says, are the diseases of the soul, while knowledge of their existence, followed by action contrary to their dictates, constitutes the cure. The *Ihyā'* identifies eleven vices: greed,

ambition, flattery, malice, envy, backbiting, vanity, showing off, dislike of censure, love of pomp, and stinginess. It proposes four ways to diagnose vices: 1) choose a mentor who will point out your vices and advise you on the cure, 2) ask a good, truthful friend to indicate the traits he dislikes in you, 3) profit by what your enemies say about you, and 4) watch out for the things you dislike in other people then see if you have them too. The first three ways of diagnosis had been mentioned earlier by Galen and al-Rāzī.

The *Mizān* categorizes diseased souls in terms of moral characteristics and attitudes: 1) those who follow their pleasures and are heedless, not giving thought to good and bad; these are the easiest to cure, 2) those who know what they are doing is wrong but do it anyway, not heeding their own conscience and giving free rein to their desires; these are more difficult to cure, 3) those who think that ugly moral characteristics are good and beautiful and right; these are almost impossible to cure, and 4) those who have grown up believing all their lives in the rightness of evil and who are proud of their evil nature; these are the most difficult to cure.<sup>45</sup>

The *Ihyā'* lists nineteen intellectual and moral virtues, grouping some of them together: repentance, patience and gratitude, hope of God's reward and fear of His punishment, poverty and asceticism, proclaiming the unity of God and trust in God, love, longing and familiarity with God, and acceptance of God's will, good intentions, sincerity and truthfulness, keeping a watch on one's actions and examining one's conscience, and the contemplation of death. The *Mizān* follows the Platonic division into the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, valor, temperance and justice<sup>46</sup> that had been used by Miskawayh. The treatment al-Ghazālī proposes for the acquisition of specific virtues is knowledge and right action. The treatment for acquiring patience in overcoming lust, for example, is outlined as follows: one must strengthen one's religion by recalling the reward of patience, and weaken desire by fasting, by not looking at anything sexually arousing, and by directing desire to a person who is sexually permissible.<sup>47</sup>

The method al-Ghazālī proposes in the treatment of each vice includes three steps: 1) identify the disease, 2) diagnose the cause, and 3) fight the disease with the medicine of knowledge ('ilm) and [right] action ('amal). By "knowledge" he says he means knowledge of the bad consequences of the vice in this world and the next, a tool required for the identification of the vice, without which the disease cannot be treated. By "action" he says he means action contrary to the dictates of the vice on a continuous basis, which eventually results in the disappearance of the vice.

On a more general level, the *Ihyā'* considers the cure of the soul to be knowledge of and for the Hereafter; this is the "higher" knowledge, the knowledge by revelation ('ilm al-mukāshafa), which cannot be taught but may be reached through the acquisition of the "lower" knowledge, the knowledge of behaviour and relationship ('ilm al-mu'āmala), which is divided into four parts: the formal rites of worship ('ibādāt), habits ('ādāt), vices leading to damnation (muhlikāt), and virtues leading to salvation (munjiyāt). The knowledge of these four constitutes the path to the cure.

Following up on the idea of knowledge being the cure, ignorance is classified as a disease of the soul in al-Ghazālī's Sufi guidebook *Ayyuhā al-walad*.<sup>48</sup> Al-Ghazālī analyzes both teachers and students in medical terms. The ignorant, says al-Ghazālī, are the diseased, and the learned the physicians. To ask a question is to present one's disease to a physician, and to answer is to attempt a cure of the disease. The teacher, he says, must be perfectly learned, for the partially learned person cannot undertake the full treatment of an ignorant soul. The student must be intelligent and willing to learn, for not every sick person should be treated, only the one who will probably benefit by the treatment and be cured.

The ignorant are categorized into four types: 1) the person whose question or objection arises from envy and hate, 2) the stupid person who does not realize he is stupid, 3) the stupid person who realizes his defects but who cannot understand the truth of things, and 4) the intelligent seeker of guidance, who is not overcome with envy and anger. The first three are

considered incurable. One who envies, says al-Ghazālī, cannot be cured, for envy is a chronic weakness, and the best response to a question arising from envy is no response. The stupid, too, are a hopeless case, and Jesus is quoted as saying, "Indeed I did not fail to bring the dead to life, but I failed to cure the stupid."<sup>49</sup> The only curable patient according to al-Ghazālī is the intelligent person, and it is obligatory upon the learned, says al-Ghazālī, to try and cure him. Note that the example of Jesus had been used with regard to the "disease" of ignorance earlier by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', in a manner exactly opposite to al-Ghazālī's, where Jesus was considered to have brought to life souls dead through ignorance by imparting to them life-giving knowledge.

Knowledge of the Divine is an important Sufi motif, and al-Ghazālī focuses upon it in *Ayyuhā al-walad*, but Sufi precepts are present in many of al-Ghazālī's works. The *Ihyā'* advocates Sufi practices such as temporary celibacy and abstinence for the cure of the soul; a disciple (*murīd*), says al-Ghazālī, should refrain from marriage in the beginning of his apprenticeship, so as not to get distracted from God by worldly pleasures, and he should not eat meat often, in order to break desire. Once he gains control of his desires, he can partake of these things in moderation. Until then, and in order to reach that stage, he has to chastise his body.<sup>50</sup> These ideas were criticized as being un-Islamic by other Muslim authors such as Ibn al-Jawzī.<sup>51</sup> The *Ihyā'* also expounds on the Sufi concept of Divine love, and calls the soul diseased that holds anything more dear than God. The *Munqidh* describes Sufi scholars as the best physicians of the soul.

In his *Jawāb al-masā'il al-arba' al-latī sa'alahā al-Bāṭiniyya bi-Hamadān*, written in response to the Bāṭiniyya's emphasis on the inner meaning of the Shari'a, al-Ghazālī develops an idea introduced by him earlier very briefly in the *Ihyā'*: the rites of worship of the Shari'a are the treatment of the soul's disease. He breaks away from Galen's and al-Rāzī's purely ethical approach to the concept of spiritual medicine, using the medical example instead to argue for the validity of the formal Shari'a rites. God is above needing the rites, which are for the benefit of the people. The doctor tries to cure the patient,

who, if he follows the doctor's prescription, is cured. If not, he perishes. The doctor is not affected either by the patient's living or dying. Diseases of the soul, says al-Ghazālī, cause the loss of the Hereafter, as the diseases of the body cause the loss of corporeal life; the rites of obedience, he says, are what constitute the cure prescribed by God for our diseased souls, while acts of disobedience or sins are like deadly poisons.<sup>52</sup>

The manner in which the formal worship rites fixed by the prophets are beneficial may be incomprehensible to us, he says in his autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, but this should be attributed to our own lack of knowledge, rather than to the rites' inherent lack of the benefit. They must be accepted by imitation (*taqlid*). A patient would be foolish to refuse to take medicine prescribed by the doctor just because he does not know exactly how the medicine works. Similarly, even if one does not understand the rites prescribed by the prophets, one must trust in their efficacy and observe them. In a detailed comparison, he explains that formal worship (*ibādāt*) is composed of acts differing in kind and number, such as prostration (*sujūd*), bowing (*rukū'*), and a different number of cycles (*rak'a*) in each ritual prayer (*ṣalāh*), just as medicines are composed of ingredients differing in kind and quantity. In another comparison he says that the supererogatory practices (*nawāfil* and *sunan*) are complements which perfect the efficacy of the basic elements of formal worship, just as medicines have additions (*zawā'id*) that influence the efficacy of the bases (*uṣūl*).<sup>53</sup>

The prophets, who are the divine law-givers, are the physicians of the soul, according to the *Jawāb al-masā'il al-arba'*,<sup>54</sup> and the religious scholars, whom al-Ghazālī calls "inheritors of the prophets," are given that designation in the *Ihyā'*. The *Munqidh* weighs the four "Seekers of Knowledge," the theologians, the philosophers, the Bāṭiniyya, and the Sufis, in terms of their effectiveness as physicians of the soul. The theologians are dismissed as unsatisfactory physicians,<sup>55</sup> the medicines of the philosophers are warned against,<sup>56</sup> and the teachings of the philosophers and the Bāṭiniyya are blamed for actually causing disease and weakening the people's faith. The Sufis are considered the ones best suited to do the job of



physician of the soul, and al-Ghazālī explicitly refers to himself as one.<sup>57</sup>

IBN AL-JAWZĪ (510-597 A.H./ 1126-1200 C.E.)

Abū al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzī was a jurisconsult, traditionalist, historian and preacher, and one of the most famous Ḥanbalis of Baghdad. In his ethical treatise by the same name as al-Rāzī's, *al-Tibb al-rūhānī* (Spiritual Medicine),<sup>58</sup> he calls base character traits diseases of the soul, and praises moderation as the ideal. He divides the character traits into those inherently base, and those acceptable in moderation, a distinction made earlier by al-Rāzī, Miskawayh, and al-Ghazālī, but Ibn al-Jawzī puts more traits than they had in the category of traits acceptable in moderation. He lists twelve traits as inherently base: passionate love, gluttony, love of power, stinginess, prodigality, falsehood, envy, malice, pride, vanity, showing off, and laziness; another six traits he considers diseases in excess only: anger, contemplation, grief, worry, fear of death, and gaiety.

The vice of pride, for example, is defined as considering oneself superior and looking down on others with contempt. The cure proposed for pride, similar to al-Ghazālī's knowledge and action cure, is given as two-fold: general and specific. The general is again said to be two-fold: one pertaining to knowledge, and one pertaining to action. The cure through knowledge, says Ibn al-Jawzī, consists in learning the intellectual proofs of the base nature of pride, while the cure through action consists in keeping the company of humble people and listening to stories about them. The specific cure lies in realizing that the source of pride—wealth, for example—can easily be taken away.

Ibn al-Jawzī proposes a seven-point method of diagnosis for the vices: 1) ask a friend, 2) be aware of the opinions of enemies, 3) find out the opinions of neighbours, 4) avoid traits that you dislike in others, 5) think about the consequences of your traits, 6) measure your actions against the actions of people in history, and 7) check to see whether your actions conform to the Shari'a.<sup>59</sup> The first two were previously proposed by both al-

Rāzī and al-Ghazālī, the third by al-Rāzī, and the fourth by al-Ghazālī. The last three ideas are Ibn al-Jawzī's. His proposal that the Shari'a be used to assess the rectitude of character traits is significant, for although the Shari'a was an important element in the earlier expositions of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' and al-Ghazālī, this is the first time the idea of the Shari'a being a touchstone is put into so many words.

CONCLUSION

The following table highlights the views of the five medieval Muslim writers on the nature of the disease, the cure, and the identity of the physician.

Writer	'Disease' of the Soul	Cure for the 'Disease'	'Physician' role ascribed to
Al-Rāzī	vice	right action ( <i>riyāda</i> )	philosophers
Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'	ignorance of God	divine knowledge, Shari'a (as a whole), right action ( <i>riyāda</i> )	prophets, progeny of Muhammad
Miskawayh	vice	right action ( <i>riyāda</i> )	(not named)
Al-Ghazālī	vice, ignorance of God	right action ( <i>riyāda</i> ), knowledge of and for the Hereafter, Shari'a rites	prophets, religious scholars (Sufis)
Ibn al-Jawzī	vice	right action ( <i>riyāda</i> )	(not named)

The views of the five writers can be divided into two broad approaches: the ethics-based approach<sup>60</sup> influenced by Greek ethical philosophy and the belief-based approach influenced by Qur'ānic salvation theory. These approaches can be contrasted in the following manner:

- The disease of the soul according to the ethics-based approach is vice, while according to the belief-based approach it is ignorance of God.
- The method of cure according to the ethics-based approach is action contrary to the dictates of the particular vice, while

according to the belief-based approach it is belief in God and divine knowledge.

- The physician who cures the soul according to the ethics-based approach is usually the philosopher, while according to the belief-based approach it is the prophets. The prophets' role of physicians of the soul is inherited by the progeny of Muḥammad according to the Shī'ī Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', and by the religious scholars according to the Sunnī al-Ghazālī.

In the various Greek-Qur'ānic approaches, al-Rāzī, whose work contains no mention of Qur'ānic references, represents the Greek end of the spectrum. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', who focus on the mission of the prophets and salvation, represent the Qur'ānic end of the spectrum. Although Greek philosophers are frequently quoted elsewhere in their *Rasā'il*, such quotations are conspicuously absent in their discussion on healing the soul. Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī and Ibn al-Jawzī fall somewhere between al-Rāzī and the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'; Greek ethical philosophy is foremost in their expositions, but it is presented within the rubric of Islamic values.

The Greek ethics-based approach to healing the soul was gradually Islamized over four centuries. The early exposition of al-Rāzī in the late ninth/early tenth centuries contained no acknowledgment of Islamic influence. Thereafter, Miskawayh in the late tenth/early eleventh centuries described the vices with direct reference to Qur'ānic teachings. Next, al-Ghazālī in the late eleventh century proposed an Islamic cure incorporating the worship rites of the Shari'a. Finally, Ibn al-Jawzī in the twelfth century brought an Islamic element into the diagnosis of the vices by proposing the Shari'a as a touchstone for the assessment of character traits.

The confluence of medieval medical practice and ethical philosophy is evident in the analogy of healing the soul. The popularity of the analogy is due in part to the fact that many medieval Muslim philosophers were practicing physicians. Al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Jawzī, for example, wrote treatises on healing the soul as a logical follow-up to their earlier medical texts.<sup>61</sup>

Medieval medical practice and ethical philosophy also have a point of confluence in the Arabic word *riyāḍa* that can mean both muscular training and spiritual habituation. *Riyāḍa* was a key term in the vocabulary of the medieval Muslim writers, and habituation was their most consistently proposed cure. Similarly, a holistic approach was used in medieval ethical expositions on healing the soul just as a holistic approach was used in medieval medicine: ethical philosophy viewed moderation of character traits as the ideal state of the soul just as medical practice aimed at balancing the configuration of the four humors in the body.

The medical analogy was a productive one for medieval Muslim writers. It enabled them to paint a graphic picture of abstract theories that would otherwise have been difficult to explain to those uninitiated in the rarefied strata of philosophical and theological ideas. The various states of the soul were described by them through physical, observable phenomena like disease and health. This led to the development and gradual homogenization of a quasi-genre of works on healing the soul, that combined ethics, medicine, and proto-psychology.

- <sup>1</sup> Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā wa khullān al-wafā'*, ed. Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (Cairo, 1928), vol. 4, pp. 22-3. Note: Vol. 3 of the *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā* deals with the soul and the intellect. It has been translated into German by Susanne Diwald as *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie* (Wiesbaden, 1975).
- <sup>2</sup> See for example the articles on "Nafs" and "Kalb" in *EI2* (I.R. Netton, "Nafs," *EI2*, vol. 7, pp. 880-4; J.C. Vadet, "Kalb," *EI2*, vol. 4, pp. 486-9).
- <sup>3</sup> See Plato, *The Republic*, translated into English by Allan Bloom (New York & London, 1968), IV, 439 c-d & 444 d-e, X, 609 b-c & 610 c-d.
- <sup>4</sup> See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated into English by H. Rackham (London, 1968) II, 4, 1105a17-b9, X, 1180b7-14. The numerous references made by Aristotle to the medical parallel have been listed and analyzed by Werner Jaeger in his article "Aristotle's use of medicine as model of method in his Ethics," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 27, pt. 1 (1957), pp. 554-61.
- <sup>5</sup> See Galen, *On the Passions and Errors of the Soul*, translated into English by Paul W. Harkins (Ohio, 1963). Galen's use of the medical analogy is discussed by Richard Walzer in his article "New light on Galen's moral philosophy (from a recently discovered Arabic source)," *Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic philosophy* (Cambridge, 1962).
- <sup>6</sup> See *Mukhtār min kalām al-hukamā' al-arba'a al-akābir* (A Selection from the Sayings of the Four Great Philosophers), ed. and translated into English by Dimitri Gutas in his book *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation: A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia*, American Oriental Series, vol. 60 (New Haven, Conn., 1975), pp. 66-6, 162, 165.
- <sup>7</sup> Plato's *Republic* was translated in Galen's paraphrase into Arabic by Ḥunayn b. Ishāq (d. 260 / 873), cf. *Risālat Ḥunayn b. Ishāq ilā 'Alī b. Yahyā fī dhikr mā turjima min kitāb Jālinūs bi-'ilmihī wa ba'd mā lam yutarjam*, in G. Bergsträsser, "Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen," *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. 17, pt. 2 (1929), p. 50; Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198) wrote a commentary on the *Republic*, translated into English by Ralph Lerner from the Hebrew version of the lost Arabic text as *Averroes on Plato's*

- Republic* (Ithaca, 1974). Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* was translated into Arabic by Ishāq b. Ḥunayn (d. 298 / 910): *al-Akhlāq*, ed. 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawi (Kuwait, 1979). Galen's *Diagnosis and Cure of the Soul's Passions* was partially translated into Syriac by Ḥunayn b. Ishāq and he later had the rest of the first treatise translated under his supervision; he entitled the two treatises on the passions and errors collectively *Kayfa yata'arraf al-insān dhunūbahū wa 'uyūbahū* (How a Person May Discover his Sins and Vices), cf. *Risālat Ḥunayn b. Ishāq*, pp. 48-9, and Manfred Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam Handbuch der Orientalistik, Ergänzungsband VI* (Leiden & Cologne, 1970), p. 51, #65. An Arabic excerpt is extant in Miskawayh's *Tahdhib al-akhlāq* (p. 189) and a Hebrew excerpt in Ibn 'Aqīn's (d. 1226) *Kitāb Tibb al-nufūs*, ed. A. S. Halkin, *American Academy for Jewish Research: Proceedings 14* (1944), pp. 66-147, excerpt on p. 71. Al-Rāzī also mentions this treatise, calling it *Maqāla fī Ta'arruf al-insān 'uyūb nafsihi* (Discovering the Vices of One's Soul), and informs us that he has abstracted the whole in his *al-Tibb al-rūhānī (al-Tibb al-rūhānī, p. 52, Spiritual Physick, p. 37)*.
- <sup>8</sup> Translation from A.J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted* (New York, 1955), vol. 1, p. 30.
- <sup>9</sup> Qur'an 2:10, 5:52, 8:49, 9:125, 22:53, 24:50, 33:12, 32 & 60, 47:20 & 29, 74:31.
- <sup>10</sup> For the unanimity of scholars with Sunni, Shi'i, Mu'tazili, and Sufi orientations in their understanding of "sickness" as "doubt," see major exegeses of Qur'ānic verse 2:10: Al-Ṭabari (d. 310 / 923, Sunni), *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wil al-Qur'an*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo, 1374 A.H.), vol. 1, pp. 278-82; al-Qushayrī (d.465 / 1072, Sufi), *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, ed. Ibrāhīm Basyūnī (Cairo, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 73-4; al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538 / 1143, Mu'tazili), *al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq ghawāmid al-tanzīl wa 'uyūn al-aqāwil fī wujūh al-ta'wil* (Beirut, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 59-60; al-Ṭabarsī (d. 548 / 1153, Shi'i), *Majma' al-bayān li 'ulūm al-Qur'an* (Cairo, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 90-2; al-Qurtubī (d. 671 / 1273, Sunni), *Al-Jāmi' li-ahkām al-Qur'an* (Cairo, 1967), vol. 1, p.197. It should be noted that an ethical exegesis for this verse does exist, but only in some of the Sufi commentaries; cf. al-Sulamī (d. 412 / 1021, Sufi), *Ziyādāt ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*, ed. Gerhard Böwering (Beirut, 1995), p. 9.

- <sup>11</sup> "Dabba ilaykum dā'u l-umami qablakumu l-ḥasadu wa l-baghdā'u wa l-baghdāu' hiya l-ḥāliqatu ḥāliqatu l-dīni la l-sha'ri wa l-ladhi nafsu Muḥammadin bi-yadihi lā tu'minū ḥattā taḥābbū afaḷa unabbi'ukum bi-shay'in idhā fa'altumūhu taḥābābūm aqshū l-salāma baynakum," al-Tirmidhi, *Sunan*, eds. A.M. Shākir, M.F. 'Abd al-Bāqi & I. 'Awaḍ (Cairo, 1937), p. 2512; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad* (Beirut, 1969), vol. 1, p. 165, vol. 6, p. 445; al-Ṭayālisi, *Musnad* (Beirut, 1321 A.H.), p. 27; al-Bighawī, *Sharḥ al-Sunna*, eds. Sh. al-Arnāwūṭ & Z. al-Shāwīsh (Beirut, 1983), p. 3301.
- <sup>12</sup> "Wa ayyu dā'in adwa'u mina l-bukhli" (What disease is worse than stinginess!), al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Beirut, n.d.), *khums* p. 15, *maghazi* p. 73; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, p. 308.
- <sup>13</sup> "Fi fātiḥati l-kitābi shifā'un min kulli dā'in" (In the *Sūrat al-Fātiḥa* is healing from every disease), al-Dārimī, *Sunan*, ed. Muṣṭafā Dīb al-Baghā (Damascus, 1991), vol. 2, p. 902, *faḍā'il al-Qur'ān*, pt. 12. This "healing" could be referring to spiritual, psychological, or physical disease (the reading of certain *suras*, especially the *Fātiḥa*, is supposed to cure fever) or all three. The cure it proposes is spiritual.
- <sup>14</sup> Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī*, ed. 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-'Īd (Cairo, 1978); translated into English by A.J. Arberry as *The Spiritual Physick of Rhazes* (London, 1950).
- <sup>15</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī*, p. 63, *Spiritual Physick*, p. 48.
- <sup>16</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī* p. 77, *Spiritual Physick*, p. 64.
- <sup>17</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī* p. 74, *Spiritual Physick*, p. 59.
- <sup>18</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī* pp. 65-6, *Spiritual Physick*, pp. 50-1.
- <sup>19</sup> Y. Marquet believes that the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' are Ismā'īlis, "Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'," *EI2*, vol. 3, pp. 1071-6. This view is supported by A. Hamdani, "An Early Fatimid Source on the Time and Authorship of the Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'," *Arabica*, vol. 26 (1979), pp. 62-75, who bases his opinion on evidence from an early Fatimid text. I.R. Netton, although not committed to any one view, points out an interesting similarity attested in al-Maqrizī's *Khiṭaṭ* (Beirut, n.d., p. 391) between the Ikhwān's secret meetings and the meetings held by the Fatimid-Ismā'īlis in Cairo, *Muslim Neoplatonists: An Introduction to the Thought of the Brethren of Purity* (Edinburgh, 1991), p. 3. The Ismā'īlis themselves consider the *Rasā'il* to be one of the important texts of their Ismā'īli heritage. S. Stern, however, based on Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī's

- remarks in his *Imtā' wa al-Mu'ānasa*, ed. Aḥmad Amin (Beirut, n.d.), pt. 2, pp. 4-5, believes that the Ikhwān were a group of five thinkers who had formed a secret association in Basra, "The Authorship of the Epistles of the Ikhwān-as-Ṣafā' and their Rasā'il," *Islamic Culture*, vol. 20 (1946), pp. 367-72, and W. Madelung believes them to be Carmathians, "Karmatians," *EI2*, vol. 4, p. 663. The question of single or joint authorship is also not absolutely settled. A.L. Tibawi compares the contents of the *Rasā'il* to the draft of deliberations by a learned society composed by a well-educated secretary, "Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā' and their Rasā'il: a Critical Review of a Century and a Half of Research," *Islamic Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1955), p. 37.
- <sup>20</sup> *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*, vol. 4, pp. 82-3.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 31-2.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 402-3, see also discussion in vol. 4, pp. 24-6.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 22-3.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 23.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 31-2.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 78.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 78.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 82-3.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 83-4.
- <sup>30</sup> Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, ed. Constantine Zurayk (Beirut, 1966); translated into English by C. Zurayk as *The Refinement of Character* (Beirut, 1968); translated into French by Mohammed Arkoun as *Traité d'Ethique* (Damascus, 1969).
- <sup>31</sup> *Tahdhīb*, pp. 176-83, chapter on "Ṣiḥḥat al-nafs: ḥifzuhā wa radduhā" (The Health of the Soul: Its Preservation and Return).
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.
- <sup>33</sup> 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Izzat, 'Ibn' Miskawayh: *Falsafatuhū al-akhlāqiyya wa maṣādiruhā* (Cairo, 1946), pp. 349-53.
- <sup>34</sup> Richard Walzer, "Some Aspects of Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*," *Greek into Arabic*, Oriental Studies, vol. 1, eds. S.M. Stern & R. Walzer (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 220-35.
- <sup>35</sup> In fixing the chronology of al-Ghazālī's works used in this paper, I have relied on George F. Hourani's "A Revised chronology of Ghazālī's writings," *JAOS*, vol. 104, pt. 2 (1984), pp. 289-302.
- <sup>36</sup> Al-Ghazālī, *Mizān al-'amal*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo, 1964).
- <sup>37</sup> Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* (Cairo, 1967); translated partially into various languages; translated completely into English by

- Fazlul Karim as *Imam Gazzali's Ihya ulum al-din* (New Delhi, 1982), poor translation.
- <sup>38</sup> Al-Ghazālī, *Ayyuhā al-walad*, ed. 'Abd Allāh Aḥmad Abū Zina (Cairo, 1975); translated into English by George H. Scherer as *O Disciple* (Beirut, 1951); translated into French by Tawfiq al-Ṣabāgh as *Lettre au Disciple* (Beirut, 1959).
- <sup>39</sup> Al-Ghazālī also calls knowledge of God and worship "medicinal" in another Sufi work, the *Kimiyā-i sa'adat*, ed. Ahmad Ārām (Tehran, 1334 A.H.), pp. 73-4; translated into English by Claud Field as *The Alchemy of Happiness* (London, 1980), p. 52.
- <sup>40</sup> Al-Ghazālī, *Jawāb al-masā'il al-arba' al-latī sa'alahā al-Bāṭiniyya bi-Hamadān*, Majallat al-Manār 29 (1908), pp. 601-8.
- <sup>41</sup> Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl wa al-muṣṣih 'an al-aḥwāl*, ed. 'Abd al-Mun'im al-'Ānī (Damascus, 1994); translated into English by W. M. Watt as "Deliverance from error and attachment to the Lord of might and majesty" in his book *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī*, (London, 1967), and by R. J. McCarthy in his book *Freedom and Fulfillment* (Boston, 1980); translated into French by Farid Jabre as *Erreur et Délivrance* (Beirut, 1959).
- <sup>42</sup> Bāṭiniyya: perjorative name given to the Shi'i Ismā'ili sect in medieval times by their opponents, that referred to the Ismā'ilis' emphasis on the inner meaning (*bāṭin*) of the Qur'ān and the Shari'a rites. The "Bāṭiniyya" were accused by them of abrogating the actual physical rites (*ẓāhir*) in favor of the knowledge of the Imamate.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibāḥiyya: perjorative term applied to certain Shi'i and Sufi groups by their opponents, and sometimes used synonymously with the term "Bāṭiniyya." The term "*ibāḥa*" (permissibility) refers to the accusation that the "Ibāḥiyya" made permissible that which was forbidden by Islamic law.
- <sup>44</sup> Three of these refutations are extant: two full-length books, *Faḍā'ih al-Bāṭiniyya*, also known as *al-Mustazhiri*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo, 1964) and *al-Qisṭās al-mustaqim*, ed. Victor Chelhod (Beirut, 1959), and an eight-page treatise, *Jawāb al-masā'il al-arba' al-latī sa'alahā al-Bāṭiniyya bi-Hamadān*. The four lost refutations are *Hujjat al-ḥaqq*, *Muṣṣil al-khilāf*, *al-Daraj al-marqūm bi al-jadāwil*, and *Qawāsim al-Bāṭiniyya* (cf. Aḥmad Badawī's introduction to the *Faḍā'ih*, pp. h,w.)
- <sup>45</sup> *Mizān*, pp. 249-50.

- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., pp. 264 ff..
- <sup>47</sup> *Ihya'*, vol. 4, p. 94; English translation, vol. 4, pp. 82-3.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ayyuhā al-walad*, pp. 75-81, #22, *O Disciple*, pp. 20-2, #22.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ayyuhā al-walad*, p. 79, *O Disciple*, p. 21.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ihyā'*, vol. 3, p. 113-24; English translation, vol. 4, pp. 86-100
- <sup>51</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbis Iblis*, ed. Ayman Ṣāliḥ (Cairo, 1995), p. 307.
- <sup>52</sup> *Jawāb al-masā'il al-arba'*, pp. 603-7.
- <sup>53</sup> *Al-Munqidh*, pp. 93-4, *Freedom and Fulfillment*, pp. 101-2.
- <sup>54</sup> *Jawāb al-masā'il al-arba'*, p. 604.
- <sup>55</sup> *Al-Munqidh*, p. 48-9, *Freedom and Fulfillment*, pp. 68-9. See also al-Ghazālī's comparison of the proofs of the science of *kalām* to medicines for the treatment of the disease of the soul in *al-Iqtisād fī al-i'tiqād*, eds. Ibrahim Chobujji & Husayn Atay (Ankara, 1962). In it he warns of the dangerous nature of *kalām* dialectic, for, he says, if the doctor who administers the medicines of *kalām* is not efficient, he does more harm than good (p. 9).
- <sup>56</sup> *Al-Munqidh*, p. 66, *Freedom and Fulfillment*, p. 81. Some of the philosopher's maxims are true, he says, but many are not, and it is important not to be deceived by the truth of the few into forgetting the falsity of the many. An example, he says, is the antidote, which is extracted from the very snake that is the source of the poison. Similarly, the proximity between truth and falsehood does not make truth falsehood nor falsehood truth.
- <sup>57</sup> *Al-Munqidh*, pp. 97-8, *Freedom and Fulfillment*, pp. 105-6. Al-Muḥāsibī also named the Sufi shaykhs physicians of the soul, explaining that the *murid* (disciple) who has gone through the process of disease and cure will try to cure others by wise counsel, for he knows the pain of sickness and pities the sick, al-Muḥāsibī, *al-Ri'āya li-ḥuqūq Allāh*, eds. 'A. Maḥmūd & Ṭ. 'A. Surūr (Cairo & Baghdad, n.d.), pp. 456-7.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Tibb al-rūḥānī*, ed. 'Abd Allāh Badrān (Damascus, 1992).
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid., pp. 106-7.
- <sup>60</sup> For a detailed study of the ethical theories of al-Rāzī, Miskawayh, the Ikhwān al-Safā', and al-Ghazālī, see Majid Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* (Leiden & New York, 1991).
- <sup>61</sup> Al-Rāzī, *al-Manṣūri fī al-tibb*, ed. Ḥāzīm al-Bakrī al-Ṣiddiqī (Kuwait, 1987), mentioned by al-Rāzī in *al-Tibb al-rūḥānī* (p. 34); Ibn al-Jawzī, *Luḡat al-amān fī al-tibb* (mss Leipz. 766, Bodl. I, 593, Garr. 1102, 'Um. 4206, Auszig Leid, 1342/3-77), cf. Carl

Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur* (Leiden, 1943), vol. 1, p. 666, mentioned by Ibn al-Jawzi in *al-Ṭibb al-rūhānī* (p. 31) as *Luḡat al-manāfi'*.